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Structures of Discrimination
Rebecca J. Cook

I. Introduction

S

ignificant strides have been made in many regions of the world
in the improvement of women’s status in the last half-century, but
the challenges of achieving women’s equality worldwide are hardly
resolved and progress is not inexorable. We have to question why we
still take steps forward and backward in bewildering alternation. Finding answers to this question requires us to address the various structures of discrimination that persist in our thinking, in our habits, and
in our prejudices. The thesis of this essay is that, in order for women
and men to be fully equal with each other, we need to understand the
structures of discrimination against women; that is, the forms of the
subordination of women that are deeply rooted in our thinking, our
myths, and in our individual, institutional, and social ways of functioning.
A fuller understanding of the overarching structures of discrimination will enable us to more effectively eliminate some of the main
human rights infringements that women face in the 21st century, such
as violence against women, trafficking, polygyny, illiteracy and undereducation, preventable maternal mortality and morbidity, and preventable HIV/AIDS. Like physical structures, social and psychological
structures of discrimination and inequality are not easily dismantled.
Their redesign takes bold leadership and innovative architects who
appreciate the landscapes and know what kinds of habitats will enable
women to live to their fullest potential. The redesign of oppressive
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structures also takes dedicated workers who have the energy, patience,
application, and perseverance that it takes to build liberating structures of equality. In thinking about how to design and build structures that enable everyone to be equal in dignity, we need to recognize
that human dignity requires that we “acknowledge the variability of
human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that should be
shown to all as they are.”1
To recognize structures of discrimination requires an understanding
of how gender subordination is rooted, for instance, in our religions,
cultures, media of communication, and habits, and how such structures persist over time and across sectors of life, such as the family,
education, employment, criminal justice, and health. Like most forms
of discrimination, gender-based discrimination is socially constructed,
but its construction varies from other structures of discrimination.
Gender differentials are thought to be acceptable when they are based
on conventions that are regarded as “natural,” instead of part and
parcel of a deliberately discriminatory structure. Groups within some
religious communities, such as those that resist women bishops in
the Anglican Church, insist that it is “against women’s nature” to be
in leadership positions.2 The Roman Catholic hierarchy continues to
rely on its self-created historical conventions in order to rationalize the
“attempted ordination” of women as being one of the gravest crimes
under church law, placing it in the same category as clerical sexual
abuse of minors.3
Some gender-based distinctions are justified by genuine biological
differences between the sexes, and therefore do not constitute discrimination. For example, distinctions made on the basis of women’s reproductive functions are reasonable in order to ensure that they can access
the care they need to go through pregnancy and childbirth safely. However, many societies have used distinctions drawn on the basis of biology as unreasonable justifications for discrimination against women
in areas of their lives unrelated to biological differences, such as their
ability to learn and to exercise judgment.
One of the reasons for the lack of improvement in women’s status
is that we have failed to develop policies that treat women’s genuine
biological differences in ways that actually accommodate those differences, such as with respect to reproduction, while we have also failed
to treat women equally with men when biological differences do not
matter, such as with respect to education. In other words, if societies
and social institutions had put the effort into safeguarding women’s
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interests when the difference between the sexes matters (such as for
maternal health) that they have put into discriminating against women
when the differences between the sexes do not matter (such as for
education and social and spiritual leadership), then the human right
of women to equality would be considerably more advanced than it is
today.
The continuing failure to address structures of gender discrimination
prevents women—and also men—from realizing their full potential.
In particular, it denies societies the benefit of the capacities, ingenuities, and leadership of which their female populations are capable.
We need to address the challenge of liberating the capacities of all of
us by understanding the structures of perception in our minds, and
how they lead to the formation of restrictive stereotypes of women,
or subgroups of women. We must also address the stereotypes of men
and subgroups of men, because, as has been explained, “Laws and customs that steer men out of the domestic sphere reinforce restrictions
on women’s participation in the public sphere, and the maintenance of
such role divisions perpetuates long-standing inequalities between the
sexes.”4 In other words, the stereotypes that restrict women’s involvement in the public sphere also restrict men’s fulfillment in the domestic
sphere.
Once one understands one’s own biases, prejudices, and how one
stereotypes, one is better equipped to engage the gender hierarchies in
societies more generally. It is for this reason that I have focused my current research and this essay on gender stereotyping as one of the more
daunting structures of discrimination against women to dismantle.
Stereotyping is part of human nature. We all stereotype and we
have all been stereotyped. Why do we stereotype? Professor Anthony
Appiah has addressed this question in illuminating ways.5 He explains
that we stereotype in order to maximize our understanding with a
minimum of effort, to achieve simplicity and predictability, to assign
difference, and to script identities. Stereotyping is not necessarily
problematic, particularly when it is used to maximize simplicity and
predictability. Stereotyping can, for example, be a useful tool to help
process the social complexity of the world, particularly as it globalizes.6
While stereotyping is not inherently problematic, it becomes problematic when it operates unjustly, such as through assigning difference
or scripting identities in ways that ignore the characteristics, abilities,
needs, wishes, and circumstances of individuals, with the effect of
denying them their rights.7
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In stereotyping to maximize predictability, we feel comforted by
the familiarity that arises from repeated general characterizations.8 In
stereotyping to ensure simplicity, we often make statistical generalizations about people, such as that women are generally physically
weaker than men. Statistical or descriptive generalizations become
problematic when they are relied upon to deny a benefit to, or impose
a burden upon, a particular woman who is atypical for that group to
which the generalization is applied. Therefore, it is unjust and discriminatory when a particular woman is denied, for instance, a farming job,
on the basis of the stereotypical belief that women are physically weak
and therefore lack the strength needed to be a farmer, even though
that particular woman is physically able to be a farmer. As the Constitutional Court of South Africa explained: “At the very least, what
is statistically normal ceases to be the basis for establishing what is
legally normative…What becomes normal in an open society, then, is
not an imposed and standardised form of behaviour that refuses to
acknowledge difference, but the acceptance of the principle of difference itself.”9
We stereotype to assign difference, to label people because they are
different from the norms with which we are familiar. We label people
because we do not want to take the time to know them as individuals. The tendency is to put them into categories and deal with them
according to those categories, not as individuals with particular needs,
characteristics, and abilities. These stereotypes are sometimes called
“false stereotypes.” We often use these stereotypes for hostile purposes, such as against members of new immigrant groups or groups
other than our own. We “otherize” members of groups particularly
when we want to feel superior. False stereotypes stigmatize members
of a group by branding them with negative characteristics, irrespective
of whether they have those characteristics, thus denying them their
dignity or individual worth.
Stereotypes that seek to script identities are often called “normative” or “prescriptive” stereotypes. The underlying reason for these
stereotypes is to prescribe attributes, roles, and behaviors to which
men and women are expected to conform. An illustration of prescriptive stereotyping is the expectation that women conform to prevailing
modesty, chastity, and obedience codes. All societies have such codes,
including those that are embedded in dress codes that, for instance,
require or expect women to wear high-heeled shoes or headscarves.
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Let me proceed by addressing various forms of gender stereotyping, including how this phenomenon creates gender hierarchies by
constructing women as inferior to men. In addition, I will explore how
stereotyping persists in different sectors of social activity in ways that
have denied individual women their rights.
II. Gender Stereotyping
How many of us realize that negative stereotyping denies individuals
their dignity and their self-esteem in ways that are never to be erased?
Uncovering how laws, policies, and practices apply, enforce, or perpetuate stereotypes of both women and men is critical to understanding
the gendered experiences of discrimination and inequality. Examining
how women and men are stereotyped in various contexts can provide
insight into the ways that the genders are disadvantaged in the exercise of their rights.
It is important to consider how both men and women are stereotyped, by reference to the terms “gender stereotype” and “gender stereotyping.” The term “gender stereotype” describes a generalized view
or preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by women
and men, or the roles that are or should be performed by each respectively.10 In this view, a gender stereotype presumes that all individuals
in the social groups of women or men possess certain characteristics or
capacities, behave in certain different ways, and/or perform specific,
predetermined distinguishable roles. The term “gender stereotyping”
describes the process of ascribing to an individual woman or man certain capacities, characteristics, or roles only by reason of membership
in the social group of women or men respectively.11
History has shown that gender stereotyping has had particularly
egregious consequences for women. Professor Sandra Fredman has
observed that:
[A] useful way of examining the continued disadvantage of women is to
identify the assumptions and stereotypes which have been central to the
perpetuation and legitimation of women’s legal and social subordination. Such assumptions have roots which stretch deep into the history of
ideas, yet continue to influence the legal and social structure of modern
society. Indeed, the continuity is startling, given the extent and fundamental nature of change in the political and economic context.12
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This observation notes how stereotypes remain long after the reality
that generated them has changed. They impair the ability of the individuals and institutions that retain them to function effectively in the
new reality.
Stereotypes can also have harmful consequences for men, particularly when men challenge the stereotypes of women as caregivers and
men as breadwinners. There are numerous court cases brought by
men who were denied various forms of assistance because, as caregivers in their circumstances, they did not meet the male stereotype of
breadwinner. Cases include that of Mr. Wiesenfeld from New Jersey,
who was denied assistance from the social security system that would
have allowed him to stay home to take care of his first-born infant son.
When his wife died giving birth to their son, he applied for mother’s
benefits, a form of assistance designed to enable widows, but not widowers, to stay at home with their children after the death of the family
breadwinner.13
Another case involved Mr. Hibbs from Nevada, who was denied the
twelve-week family care leave (to which women were entitled) to stay
at home to take care of his ailing wife.14 A further case involved Mr.
Petrovic, a student from Austria working part time, who was denied
a parental leave allowance under the Austrian Unemployment Benefit
Act, to stay at home and take care of his child while his wife continued working.15 His claim was that the distinction in the Austrian Act,
allowing only mothers to take a leave when a child was born, was discriminatory.
Mr. Wiesenfeld and Mr. Hibbs were successful before the U.S.
Supreme Court when they challenged the respective denials as unconstitutional. In Wiesenfeld, the Court went beyond simply deciding the
case as an equal pay case, wrongfully denying working men the benefits that were provided to working women. It decided that the state is
precluded by the Equal Protection provision of the U.S. Constitution
from imposing sex-role stereotypes of male breadwinner-female caregiver. The Court similarly affirmed Mr. Hibbs’ gender-nonconforming
choice to stay at home to take care of his wife because “sex-role stereotyping was a constitutional problem of such magnitude that it justified
an affirmative grant of twelve weeks leave. Had Congress attempted to
combat such discrimination simply by requiring formal equality in the
administration of leave benefits, employers would have been able to
comply with the law by offering no family leave to employees of either
sex.”16 That is, in order to achieve real or substantive equality, the
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Court had to secure family care benefits for women and extend them
to men in order to remedy the sex role stereotypes.17
In contrast to Mr. Wiesenfeld and Mr. Hibbs, Mr. Petrovic was
unsuccessful before the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court missed an opportunity to explain how the Austrian Act
restricting family care leave to only mothers violated the rights of
nondiscrimination of both sexes. Such restrictions devalue the efforts
of mothers who stay in the workforce, and denigrate the domestic contributions of fathers. In this sense, stereotypes of women and men can
have mutually reinforcing negative consequences.
Conditions for social stratification and the subordination of women
exist when practices, such as gender stereotyping, are both socially pervasive across sectors and socially persistent over time.18 The conditions
for social stratification and subordination are exacerbated when stereotypes are institutionalized in a state’s laws, policies, and practices.
An example is the widespread institutionalization, through judicial
reasoning, of sexual stereotypes of women that excuse and rationalize
sexual assault; for instance, that women who do not fight back against
sexual assault are consenting to the aggressor’s acts.19 The saturation
of law with sexual stereotypes, such as the stereotype that women are
in a state of perpetual consent to men’s initiation of sexual activity, has
contributed to the frequent blaming of victims and survivors of sexual
assault20 and, for example, the denial of female sexual agency and the
privileging of male sexuality.21 This affirms the stereotype that “boys
will be boys,” and does nothing to dismantle the stereotype of men as
creatures who are unable to control their sexual urges.
There are many forms of gender stereotypes. Sex stereotypes concern generalizations about women’s and men’s physical, emotional,
and cognitive capacities. Sexual stereotypes concern those “characteristics or qualities that play a role in sexual attraction and desire, sexual
initiation and intercourse, sexual intimacy, sexual possession, sexual
assault…sexual objectification and exploitation.”22 Sex role stereotypes
ascribe roles to women and men that are perceived as culturally appropriate to each of them, based on prevailing gender ideologies.23 These
stereotypes often combine with other characteristics, such as race, age
or immigrant status, to create compounded stereotypes, such as generalizations about adolescent girls or Muslim women.
Gender stereotypes are shaped by the contexts in which they operate. In order to accurately diagnose and effectively remedy them it is
therefore important to understand the underlying contexts in which
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they are applied, enforced, or perpetuated. One approach to understanding the context in which a gender stereotype operates is to think
about it in terms of individual factors, situational factors in different
sectors of society, and broader factors.24 Understanding these conditioning influences can help to explain how gender stereotyping contributes to social stratification and the subordination of women,25 how
stereotyping is perpetuated, and the process by which it might be
eliminated.26
As individuals,27 we absorb stereotypes through our everyday interactions with people and our exposure to the culture in which we
function.28 Repeated encounters embed stereotypes deep into our subconscious minds,29 where we (often) come to accept them uncritically
as our “normal” understanding of the world, and we begin to act and
react in conformity with them.30
Situational factors31 provide insights into how an individual is
“affected by and adapts to social contexts, ranging from proximal influences (e.g., the norms of one’s immediate work group) to more distal
influences (e.g., the division of male and female roles in society).”32 In
the health sector, for instance, stereotypes about women have emerged
in regard to their capacity to make free and informed decisions about
their health care, exercise moral agency to make decisions about their
reproduction and sexuality, balance influences of rationality and
emotionalism, and exercise autonomy to determine their own roles in
society.
Broader factors,33 such as historical, cultural, religious, and legal considerations, can provide insights into how a community integrates
gender stereotypes into its social structures and meanings, as well as
how such stereotypes might be eliminated.34
Understanding the various means of perpetuating gender stereotypes in different sectors of society is critical to dismantling them.35
When a state applies, enforces, or perpetuates a gender stereotype in
its laws, policies, or practices, or fails to adopt legal and other measures to eliminate and remedy wrongful gender stereotyping through
means such as public advertisements and public school curricula or
textbooks, it institutionalizes that stereotype and gives it the force of
the law or of public approval and authority. As an influential and
instructive institution of the state, the law may condone the operation
of a gender stereotype and create an environment of legitimacy and
impunity around its use. When a state legitimizes a harmful gender
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stereotype in this way, it creates a framework that enables the perpetuation of discrimination against women.
The ability to eliminate harmful stereotyping is contingent on the
wrong first being named.36 To borrow a medical metaphor, an ailment
needs first to be diagnosed in order for it to be treated.37 Exposing
operative stereotypes, examining their origins, contexts, and processes
of perpetuation, and analyzing how their application, enforcement, or
perpetuation harms individuals or groups of individuals, are critical to
their remedy.38 Once wrongful stereotyping has been recognized, it is
then possible to identify whether, and if so how, operative stereotypes
impair or nullify rights to non-discrimination and equality, and/or violate other human rights.39 Let me now explore how gender stereotypes
have been named, and once identified, how they have been shown to
infringe upon human rights in the sectors of criminal justice, health,
and the family.
III. Gendered Disappearances and Criminal Justice
The issue of how stereotyping of young, poor migrant women in the
criminal justice system of the city of Juarez, Mexico, was associated
with their gendered disappearances was addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court) in its recent decision in the
so-called Cotton Field case.40 That decision held the state of Mexico
responsible under the American Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention) and the Convention on Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women (the Convention Belém do
Pará) because the police failed to investigate the disappearances and
murders of three poor, migrant women, two of whom were minors.
The bodies of these three women, Claudia Ivette Gonzalez, Esmeralda
Herrera Monreal, and Laura Berenice Ramos Monarrez, were found in
a cotton field near Juarez, the Mexican town bordering El Paso, Texas,
in the Mexican state of Chihuahua.
The decision is important for a number of reasons. For the first time,
the Court considered the positive obligations of states to respond to
violence against women by private actors. It also looked at the murders of these three women in the context of mass violence against
women and structural discrimination, and found that gender-based
violence constitutes gender discrimination. The Court decided that the
state violated the obligations under the Convention not to discriminate
(Article 1(1)) in connection with the obligation to guarantee the right
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to life (Article 4(1)); the right to physical, mental and moral integrity
(Article 5(1)); the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment
(Article 5(2)); and the right to personal liberty and security (Article
7(1)). These multiple violations operated to the detriment of the three
victims. In addition, the Court found the state in violation of the victims’ next of kin’s right of access to justice and to a fair trial (Article
8(1)), and to simple, prompt, effective recourse (Article 25(1)) to protections of the Convention.41
In presenting the facts of the case, the Court included a section
entitled, “Stereotyping allegedly manifested by officials to the victims’
next of kin.”42 This referenced the testimony of the victims’ mothers to
show how state officials had generated demeaning and hostile sexual
stereotypes of the victims’ roles, attributes, and characteristics, in part
to justify their avoidance of their obligations to investigate. The Court
cited testimony of Esmeralda Herrera’s mother, who said that when she
reported her daughter’s disappearance, the authorities told her that the
young woman “had not disappeared, but was out with her boyfriends
or wandering around with friends,” and “that if anything happened to
her, it was because she was looking for it, because a good girl, a good
woman, stays at home.”43 Importantly, the Court concluded that, “the
comments made by officials that the victims had gone off with a boyfriend or that they led a disreputable life…constitute stereotyping.”44
In the section of its judgment entitled, “Obligation not to discriminate: violence against women as discrimination,” the Court found that
“gender stereotyping refers to a preconception of personal attributes,
characteristics or roles that correspond or should correspond to either
men or women.”45 The Court then referred to the statements made
by the state officers in order to identify how hostile and dismissive
stereotypes were perpetuated in the particular context of the police
authorities: “Bearing in mind the statements made by the State…the
subordination of women can be associated with practices based on
persistent socially-dominant gender stereotypes, a situation that is
exacerbated when the stereotypes are reflected, implicitly or explicitly,
in policies and practices and, particularly, in the reasoning and language of the judicial police authorities, as in this case.”46
Significantly, the Court concluded this section by saying that, “The
creation and use of stereotypes becomes one of the causes and consequences of gender-based violence against women.”47 This judicial
recognition of harmful gender stereotyping in the criminal justice system, and how it contributed to official indifference to the gendered
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disappearances and murders of women in Juarez, has no doubt raised
consciousness about this phenomenon in Mexico and beyond. Hopefully, the Cotton Field decision will promote better understanding of
women’s collective experiences of one of the more pernicious forms of
the social practice of gender stereotyping and discrimination in other
parts of the world, such as Canada, where comparable stereotyping of
gendered disappearances of indigenous women prevails.48
IV. Health Disparities
Women regularly face obstacles in accessing health care services and
information, especially in the area of reproductive health. The nature,
frequency, and immutability of obstacles vary greatly, depending on
such factors as a woman’s socio-economic status, age, race, religion,
sexual orientation, and geographical location. A woman might have
difficulty gaining timely access, perhaps, to emergency contraception
due to the refusal of her only accessible pharmacist to provide this
contraceptive on grounds of conscience.49 Such a refusal is based on
the stereotype of women as morally inferior and lacking the capacity
for moral agency.50 Similarly, opponents of abortion rights, in support of their efforts to abolish, redirect, or restrict women’s access to
abortion, have sought to perpetuate the stereotype of women as weak
and vulnerable, and therefore in need of their protection.51 The stereotype of women as incompetent decision-makers in their own reproductive lives has been enforced through laws, policies, and practices that,
among other matters, allow the forcible sterilization of women, particularly members of minority, immigrant, or indigenous communities.52
The stereotype of women as primarily mothers has been applied,
enforced, and perpetuated through laws, policies, or practices that
deny or restrict women’s access to affordable contraceptives and
related health care services and information.53 An extreme example of
such denials is shown in the Philippines through an Executive Order
issued by the mayor of Manila City that prohibited the distribution
of hormonal contraceptives in the public health service.54 The Executive Order sends a clear message that women’s natural role and destiny is as mothers, meaning that women should prioritize childbearing
and childrearing over all other roles they might perform or choose in
that community. The implication is that women in Manila City should
be treated primarily as mothers (whether actual or potential), and
not according to their individual needs or possible preferences not
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to become mothers. According to this stereotypical thinking, it is not
essential that women have access to affordable methods of artificial
contraception since this could potentially deny women the opportunity to fulfill their “duties” as mothers, even though birth spacing is
a key component to reduce rates of maternal mortality and morbidity,
which is often central to the survival and well-being of children.55
In order to understand the stereotypes applied through the Executive Order, it is important to consider the contextual factors that surrounded its application.56 To elaborate, at the time the Executive Order
was introduced there had been a “growing Catholicization of public health policies.”57 Several prominent state figures, including then
national President Arroyo, justified the Order on the grounds that
denying women access to artificial contraceptives is consistent with the
teachings of the Catholic Church on family planning.58 State officials
imposed their stereotyped views about women’s proper role by invoking the exclusively male-generated doctrines of Catholicism.
It is also significant that the Executive Order was introduced in the
broader context of a legal culture that perpetuates stereotypes within
family and marriage relations with impunity. For example, the Family
Code of the Philippines bolsters the prescriptive stereotype that men
should be the decision-makers and therefore bear ultimate power and
authority within their families.59 In the case of disagreements over
marital property or parental authority over children, the Family Code
provides that the husband’s/father’s decision shall prevail over the
wife’s/mother’s preferences. The Executive Order reinforces the stereotypes that married women should be constantly prepared to be mothers, that husbands should constantly welcome fatherhood, and that
both should be constantly obedient to the Catholic Church.
Situational factors include the widespread state practice of rewarding women, through monetary compensation and other gifts, for stereotype-conforming behavior (i.e., for fulfilling their natural “destiny”
to be mothers). This, in turn, has facilitated the institutionalization
of the stereotype of women primarily as mothers.60 For example, one
report has described how “[t]he mayor [of Manila City] gives prizes
for having the most number of children, and the current champion has
21 kids.”61 In addition, the state practice of harassing and intimidating
health care providers who give women access to contraceptives has
further facilitated the stereotype’s institutionalization. These practices
have enabled the imposition of the state’s views of women’s “proper”
role in society, restricting women to the role of motherhood and the
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behavior expected of mothers (e.g., the prioritization of the needs of
children over women). This has taken place even when those practices
pose well-recognized, serious—even fatal—risks to women’s health,62
and frustrate women’s exercise of their human rights other than to voluntary motherhood.
V. Disparities in the Family
Prescriptive stereotypes of women’s “proper” role in the family have
enabled the perpetuation of disparities in family life. One of the more
extreme forms of such disparities is the practice of polygyny; that is,
the practice of a man taking multiple wives.63 The term “polygamy”
refers to the simultaneous union of either a husband or wife to multiple
spouses. As a general term, polygamy therefore includes both the rare
practice of polyandry, a wife taking multiple husbands, and polygyny,
the more frequent circumstance of a husband taking multiple wives.
There has been a renewed interest in the disparities associated with
polygynous “marriages”; that is, social unions approximating marriage even if not legally recognized as such. This interest has arisen
in the wake of recently published books on the actual experience of
polygyny in North America,64 several U.S. court decisions on the practice of polygyny,65 and a pending reference case in Canada regarding
the constitutionality of its criminal prohibition of polygyny.66
Beyond North America, the South African Constitutional Court has
recently held that Muslim women in polygynous marriages should be
able to inherit equally with Muslim women in monogamous marriages
and with non-Muslim women, despite provisions in the South African
Intestate Succession Act of South Africa.67 In deciding the legal effect of
this Act, the Court explained that:
By discriminating against women in polygynous Muslim marriages on
the grounds of religion, gender and marital status, the Act clearly reinforces a pattern of stereotyping and patriarchal practices that relegates
women in these marriages to being unworthy of protection. Needless
to say, by so discriminating against those women, the provisions in the
Act conflict with the principle of gender equality which the Constitution
strives to achieve. That cannot, and ought not, be countenanced in a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights.68
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Religious and customary laws that permit polygyny continue to rely
on sex differences as a central axis in the distribution of marital rights
and obligations. In doing so, they are premised upon and perpetuate
gender stereotypes hostile to women’s equality that have been rejected
in many laws.69 The content of such gender stereotypes varies according to the particular legal system under which polygyny continues
to be practiced. In general, however, a dominant sexual and sex role
stereotype of women in polygynous unions is as “wife” and “mother.”
Each of these roles, including the sexual component of “wife,” supports and reinforces the other. They mark married women as different
types of persons from men.
Historically, the common law of coverture also distributed marital
rights and obligations unequally according to sex, in favor of husbands’ control of their wives’ property.70 Persons of different sex were
understood to be different types of persons under the laws of marriage.
A wife was understood to be subsumed within her husband’s legal personality, under his family name. Children of a marriage were understood to fall under the name and the near-complete custodial power
of their father, affording him control of their educational, religious,
and other forms of upbringing. Stereotypes of feminine dependence,
fragility, and commercial naivety were constructed in opposition to
stereotypes of masculine protective breadwinning and financial acumen. An increasing number of family laws regulating marriage and
cohabitation have since moved away from this expressly sex-based
construction of family relations. Spousal rights and obligations in the
legal systems of some Western countries now apply to both parties
equally regardless of sex.71 In fact, the legislative adoption of same-sex
marriage has removed the notion of sex difference as essential to marriage altogether.72
Depending on the relevant customary or religious system that
retains polygyny as an acceptable institution, it may be that the role
of “wife” implies continuous sexual availability to one’s husband, as
it once did under laws that did not criminalize rape in marriage.73
Also, when a wife is sexually unavailable, such as during pregnancy or
post-partum abstinence in some contexts, polygyny can function unilaterally to satisfy a husband’s “natural” masculine “sexual needs.”74
Abstinence is not a stereotypical expectation of men.
It may also be a condition of “wifehood” under such a system that
one becomes a mother. The role of “mother” often has a more burdensome construction in the polygynous context than in the monog-
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amous one. Where polygyny is practiced as a means to maximize
reproduction by husbands, wives are understood primarily as procreators. Moreover, wives may be limited in their ability to determine
the number and spacing of children, and therefore unable to protect
their health and their very lives, in violation of their “rights to decide
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable
them to exercise these rights….”75 The wife in a polygynous family has
been described as “operating as a passive being for procreation.”76 The
notion that one might be a spouse, without choosing to be a parent,
is foreclosed where polygyny is practiced for the express purpose of
maximizing family and community reproduction.
There is evidence that maximizing reproduction is one of the theological principles of polygyny as still practiced among fundamentalist Mormon groups in Canada and the United States.77 Within the
polygynous community in Bountiful, British Columbia, for instance,
religious teachings regarding polygyny negatively stereotype women
and female children into solely reproductive and subservient roles.
As one former polygynous wife of this sect has articulated, religious
doctrine maintained that she, like all girls and women, had the duty
to contribute to the “production” of an abundance of children through
polygynous marriage in order for the community to survive the pending Apocalypse.78 At the centre of this patriarchal, religious dictum lies
a belief that women and girls are meant to serve men, and should they
disobey, “their souls will burn in hell for eternity.”79
The centrality of motherhood (to serve the purpose of creating
fatherhood) is similarly evident in some of the religious and customary
norms governing marriage among Islamic and African communities.
Infertility of the first wife, or her “inability” to bear a son, is often considered a sufficient reason for a court (or the first wife) to grant permission to a man to take an additional wife. A court or an earlier wife may
also approve a husband taking an additional wife when a second or
later wife fails to produce a male child. It has been noted that, “childless women are often sneered at for their inability to conceive. If not
divorced, lack of reproductive capacity is a justification for polygamy
amongst some people….”80 In a study of Bedouin Arab polygynous
wives, having too many daughters was one of the four main reasons
cited for why a husband took an additional wife.81
If polygynous wives and mothers do not fulfill the prescribed roles
of procreator and satisfier of men’s sexual urges, they may be deval-
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ued in the family and community. The inherent wrong of this sex role
stereotype is that it prohibits a woman from making or fairly negotiating her own life plan in ways that are equal to her husband’s ability to determine his life course. Male-factor infertility, which medical
evidence shows to be as common as female-factor infertility, is denied.
The stereotypical view is that a couple’s infertility is generally attributable to the woman’s deficiency.
Stereotypes of women in polygynous marriages persist in the immigration context. The trend in immigration laws and policies in countries committed to monogamy is to prohibit the entry of polygynous
families. In the immigration laws of Australia,82 Canada,83 the U.K.,84
and the U.S.,85 for instance, polygamy is a bar to immigration. The
approaches countries take to ensure that only monogamous families
immigrate vary and can have profound implications for the perpetuation of harmful stereotypes of immigrant women. Some countries,
such as Australia and Canada, provide that only the first marriage may
potentially be recognized for immigration purposes. Australia86 and
Canada87 therefore require that the sponsoring spouse provide evidence of lawful divorce of any subsequent concurrent wives.
In contrast, the U.K.88 and U.S.89 allow the husband to determine
which of his two or more wives he will bring. In the U.K., it is the order
in which polygamous wives come to the U.K. for settlement (not the
order in which they married the husband) that is the decisive factor for
determining which wife is recognized as the lawful spouse for immigration purposes.90 The U.S. immigration policy “permits the husband
in a polygamous marriage to sponsor a first wife without terminating
subsequent marriages. A husband may sponsor a second or subsequent
wife, provided he terminates all previous marriages and then remarries the beneficiary spouse to satisfy the requirement that the marriage is valid for immigration purposes.”91 It has been explained that,
“the operation of U.S. immigration policy for spouse-based categories
empowers a husband in a polygamous marriage to choose which wife
he will sponsor for immigration status; in contrast, a second or subsequent wife cannot confer or receive status for any family category
based on a relationship created solely by the polygamous marriage.”92
It has been observed that, “Much of the gender bias in [U.S.] immigration law is a legacy of the centuries-old doctrine of coverture, under
which a woman’s legal existence merged with that of her husband
upon marriage.”93 This provides insights into the gendered nature of
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immigration policies and how stereotypes of women as dependent,
subordinate people are perpetuated:
At common law, a husband had ownership rights over his wife and was
legally entitled to control her income and property…This headship of
the husband in the family permitted him to control where the wife and
family resided and all aspects of their existence…The very structure of
the spouse-based immigration scheme grew out of this doctrine [coverture]. The first laws establishing the right of a citizen or resident alien to
petition on behalf of a spouse were gender-specific—only male citizens
and male resident aliens could sponsor their spouses; female citizens or
resident aliens enjoyed no reciprocal rights to sponsor their husbands.94

The U.K. and U.S. approaches give almost absolute power to the husband in a polygynous marriage who is a citizen or permanent resident
in a destination country. It permits “the husband to determine not only
the immigration status of each wife, but also where each wife will live,
whether that wife can live with and have custody of her children, and
whether that wife can work if she is in the United States. These are the
very powers bestowed upon a husband under the doctrine of coverture.”95 The U.S., the U.K., and countries with comparable immigration
and related laws have thereby failed to break the links of their historical stereotyping.
VI. Dismantling Harmful Gender Stereotyping
You might well be asking how harmful stereotypes can be dismantled,
and by whom. We all have a role to play in dismantling stereotypes, in
particular by raising our own consciousness about how we stereotype
and how we have been stereotyped. Raising awareness in our own
situations can have humorous sides: How does a woman respond to a
male colleague who turns to her in a meeting and asks her to take the
secretarial role of taking notes? How does a female vice president of a
university respond to a male professor who asks her to get him a drink
at a university cocktail reception? Such anecdotes could be developed
into humorous movies that elaborate different response scenarios.
I suspect many of you have your favourite movies about stereotypes
that have captured your imagination in ways that other forms of communication have not. One of my favourite films is Bend it Like Beckham, about an adolescent girl who defied her community’s feminine
stereotype in order to become a skilled soccer player like her model,
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David Beckham.96 Women’s sports is a way to break stereotypes of
women as weak and vulnerable. However, women’s sports are not
far removed from gender roles and stereotypes, because women are
more restricted in the kind of aggressive behaviour in which they can
engage. For example, body-checking is not allowed in women’s ice
hockey. Rewarding men’s aggression and winning at any cost has led
to the observation that men’s “college sports culture is fostering…an
increase in violence and dirty tricks.”97 This culture of sports violence
presents a challenge as women seek equality in the recognition and
rewards of their sporting accomplishments.
We all have a role to play in ensuring that our educational institutions do not perpetuate gender stereotypes in how their admissions
policies are structured, in how their curricula are designed, and in how
leadership is fostered. Some years ago, a Mr. Hogan challenged the
Mississippi University for Women because it denied him, a qualified
male applicant, admission to its all-female nursing program, because
of his sex. He won before the U.S. Supreme Court because his denial
violated the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.98
In Australia, the Court of Appeals of New South Wales held that
it was discriminatory to segregate students in single sex schools in
which boys were given courses that equipped them for university,
commerce, and industry, while girls had courses in domestic science
and home economics. The Court found that these curricula differences
unlawfully reflected sex-role stereotypes of men working in business,
industry, and manufacturing as breadwinners, and women working
as homemakers. The result was that this limited girls’ future choices
about education, vocations, and careers.99
We do not have to wait for brave individuals to challenge education
policies before courts of law. We can proceed by reviewing how we
teach in the classroom, for example, by asking colleagues to sit in on
classes and advise us on how we can ensure that we are not reinforcing
negative or restrictive gender stereotypes by the way we teach.
In addition to humour, films, sports, and education as methods
of raising consciousness about harmful stereotypes, various human
rights systems are instrumental in acknowledging negative stereotypes, exposing their harms, and providing remedies. In the Mexican
“Cotton Field” case, we saw how the Inter-American Court recognized
how prejudice about women is perpetuated in the criminal justice system through categorical thinking about women’s appropriate roles,
attributes, and characteristics in society, as well as how that thinking
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discriminates against them and denies justice and protection when
confronted by gross violations of their rights.
To its great credit, in the part of its judgment on Reparations, the
Inter-American Court called for training that enables all state officials
to recognize the effect on women of stereotyped ideas and opinions in
relation to the meaning and scope of human rights.100 It ordered the
state “to continue implementing permanent education and training
programs and courses in: (i) human rights and gender; (ii) a gender
perspective for due diligence in conducting preliminary investigations
and judicial proceedings in relation to the discrimination, abuse and
murder of women based on their gender, and (iii) elimination of stereotypes of women’s roles in society.”101
The Court’s members were greatly assisted in their work by factfinding reports about the disappearances of women more generally,
undertaken by nongovernmental organizations102 and human rights
bodies established by human rights treaties to monitor state compliance.103 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (the CEDAW Committee), the U.N. treaty body established to
monitor the compliance of states with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),104 used
its inquiry procedures to investigate the grave and systematic nature
of the gendered disappearances.105 States are obligated under CEDAW
Article 5(a) to address “prejudices and customary and all other practices” that are based on concepts of “the inferiority or superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” This
Article 5(a) wording is quoted by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights,106 established to monitor the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa.107
Thanks to the fact-finding report by several nongovernmental organizations that exposed the harmful effects of the Manila City Executive
Order,108 the CEDAW Committee is currently undertaking an Inquiry
Report into the grave and systematic effects of the Manila City Ordinance on women’s health and equality.
States that have ratified CEDAW, known as States Parties, have an
obligation to report to the CEDAW Committee on a periodic basis on
what they have done to bring their laws, policies, and practices into
compliance with the Convention. As a guide to states for preparing
their reports, the CEDAW Committee explained that, “States parties’
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obligation is to address prevailing gender relations and the persistence
of gender-based stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures and institutions.”109
In applying this mandate to the issue of polygyny, the CEDAW
Committee has consistently articulated the need to eliminate cultural,
customary, and legal norms that perpetuate the practice. The CEDAW
Committee views polygyny as a harmful traditional practice,110 and
encourages states to analyze traditions, customs, and stereotypes of
women’s roles in the family that contribute to the continuation of its
practice.111 In its Concluding Observations on the report of one state
party, the Committee noted its concern about:
the prevalence in the State party of a patriarchal ideology with firmly
entrenched stereotypes and the persistence of deep-rooted adverse cultural norms, customs and traditions, including forced and early marriage,
[and] polygamy…that discriminate against women, result in limitation
to women’s educational and employment opportunities and constitute
serious obstacles to women’s enjoyment of their human rights.112

To combat such stereotypes, the CEDAW Committee encouraged
public-awareness campaigns “to eliminate the gap between statutory
law and social customs and practices, especially with regard to family law.”113 This may be required for women in polygynous unions in
states where family practices do not accord with statutory law. In particular, the Committee’s direction that state parties have an obligation
to ensure “women’s awareness of their rights”114 is relevant to those
states where some women may be unaware of the legal protections
available to them, should they wish to leave polygynous unions.
VII. Concluding Thoughts
There is no doubt that global priorities, such as terrorism, financial crises, and climate change, have eclipsed the priority of women’s issues.
We need to reconfigure women’s issues in view of changing global
dynamics, but we must start by restructuring our own categorical
thinking. Understanding how stereotyping takes place in our minds,
how it is facilitated in particular contexts, and how it is fueled by the
practices of social institutions, courts of law, the media, and different religious and cultural ideologies provides insight into how societ-
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ies subordinate women and, sometimes, men. In opening our eyes to
gender distinctions derived from social practices and to how societies
inequitably construct gender differences, we will be better equipped to
address the challenge of overcoming the many manifestations of structural discrimination. 
•
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